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Embodied Episodic Memory: a New Case for Causalism? 
 
Denis PERRIN 
ABSTRACT. Is an appropriate causal connection to the past experience it represents a 
necessary condition for a mental state to qualify as an episodic memory? For some 
years this issue has been the subject of an intense debate between the causalist theory 
of episodic memory (CTM) and the simulationist theory of episodic memory (STM). 
This paper aims at exploring the prospects for an embodied approach to episodic 
memory and assessing the potential case for causalism that could be founded on it. In 
a critical section, it argues that the empirical data to which STM appeals are both 
incomplete and inconclusive, and on closer examination even provide support for a 
proceduralist version of CTM. In a constructive section, it elaborates on the notion of 
a necessary causal connection in terms of particular procedural patterns acquired at 
encoding and operative at retrieval, grounding this move on recent empirical data 
about eye movements in mnemonic mental imagery. 
Keywords: Episodic memory, procedural memory, embodied cognition, sensorimotor 
view, causalism, simulationism. 
RÉSUMÉ. La mémoire incarnée : une nouvelle défense du causalisme ? Une 
connexion causale appropriée à l’expérience passée qu’il représente est-elle une 
condition nécessaire pour qu’un état mental soit un souvenir épisodique ? Cette 
question donne lieu depuis plusieurs années à un débat intense entre la théorie 
causaliste (CTM) et la théorie simulationniste (STM) du souvenir épisodique. Cet 
article vise à explorer la perspective ouverte par une approche incarnée de ce type de 
souvenir, et à évaluer la possibilité d’élaborer grâce à elle une défense du causalisme. 
Dans une section critique, il soutient que les données empiriques auxquelles STM fait 
appel sont à la fois incomplètes et non-concluantes, et qu’à y regarder de plus près 
elles suggèrent même d’adopter une version procéduraliste de CTM. Dans une section 
constructive, il élabore la notion d’une connexion causale nécessaire en termes de 
schèmes procéduraux particuliers acquis à l’encodage et opératoires lors de la 
remémoration, et il appuie cette proposition sur des données empiriques récentes 
relatives au rôle des mouvements oculaires dans l’imagerie mentale mnésique. 
Mots-clés : Souvenir épisodique, mémoire procédurale, cognition incarnée, 
conception sensorimotrice, causalisme, simulationnisme. 
1 – INTRODUCTION: EMBODIED COGNITION AND THE DEBATE BETWEEN 
CAUSALISM AND SIMULATIONISM 
Is an appropriate causal connection to the past experience it represents a 
necessary condition for a mental state to qualify as an episodic memory? By 
episodic memory, I shall mean the type of memory representing past 
experiences of events that a subject has undergone and that typically involves 
mental imagery at retrieval (Tulving, 1985, 2002)1. There has been an intense 
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1 In what follows, absent further specification, “memory” will mean “episodic memory”. 
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debate for some years between the causalist theory of episodic memory (CTM) 
and the simulationist theory of episodic memory (STM) over the issue of 
causation in episodic memory. Behind this debate, one finds the philosophy of 
mind’s project to carve up the mind at its joints. Cast in the idiom of cognitive 
science, the problem is to determine what the main components that comprise a 
cognitive system are and how they relate to one another. A core implication of 
CTM is that memory and imagination are different capacities that issue 
different cognitive achievements, while on STM memory is nothing but a 
species of imagination2. In other words, depending on whether one endorses 
either a causal or a non-causal definition of what constitutes an episodic 
memory, one will conceptualize episodic memory either as a cognitive capacity 
distinct from imagination or as a cognitive capacity akin to imagination. From 
this basis, one will thus be led to advocate for different pictures of the structure 
of the human neurocognitive system. Let us specify the opposing views. 
On standard CTM (Martin and Deutscher, 1966; see also Bernecker, 2010 
and Michaelian, 2011, though they depart from standard CTM), an appropriate 
causal connection is a necessary condition of episodic memory to the effect 
that it is required in order that the representational information (for short: the 
content) acquired during the past experience be transmitted to the present 
mnemonic mental state. But critics of standard CTM have questioned the 
neurocognitive plausibility of such a transmission (Robins, 2016; Michaelian, 
2016) by invoking empirical data that suggest it is both unlikely and 
unnecessary. This has cleared the way for so-called post-causal theories, on 
which no appropriate causal connection is necessary (Michaelian, 2016; 
Fernández, 2019; see also Addis, 2020). The most prominent and explicitly 
anti-causalist view is STM, on which (in brief) remembering is “simulating or 
imagining episodes from the personal past” (Michaelian, 2016, p. 97). 
However, a recent reply to STM has suggested that CTM can be amended to 
produce a version that does not imply transmission of content (Perrin, 2018; 
Werning, 2020). In particular, on Perrin’s proceduralist view (Perrin, 2018; 
Michaelian and Sant’Anna, 2019), inspired by Kolers’s work (Kolers & 
Roediger, 1984), the necessary causal connection links the procedures required 
by the reconstruction of the memory to the ones required by the construction of 
the past experience, rather than the respective contents of the past experience 
and the memory of it. Perrin’s proceduralist causalism does not endorse the 
notion of a particular causal connection, however, granting to the critics of 
CTM that our neurocognitive system is such that a distinct particular 
connection to the past is very unlikely. Instead, he makes a case for a necessary 
connection between types of experienced events and correlative types of 
episodic memories, with the particularity of the content of memories being 
provided at retrieval by the phenomenology of remembering—due to 
processing fluency, the memory is interpreted as resulting from a particular 
past experience – and by semantic memory – semantic information is expected 
to supply the particular spatiotemporal address of the event represented by the 
memory. 
                                                 
2 A further possible option suggested to me by Francesco Ianì would be to conceptualize imagination as 
a species of memory. 
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Capitalizing on the proceduralist picture, in this exploratory paper I will 
assess whether taking into consideration the sensorimotor nature of episodic 
memory can provide reasons to think that it typically involves particular causal 
connections to the remembered past experience. In other words, rather than 
taking for granted that the embodied approach only re-embodies cognitive 
systems, as it were, while remaining neutral on the issue of what particular 
components comprise these systems, I shall examine whether the embodied 
approach could have implications for the question of the components that 
comprise the systems. Specifically, I shall ask whether it supports the notion of 
a particular causal connection involved in episodic memory, and accordingly, a 
strong distinction between imagination and memory. The paper comports two 
parts. In the critical part (section 2), I will argue against STM that the empirical 
data it calls on to counter the causalist claim that something – content, for 
standard CTM – is transmitted over time are both incomplete and inconclusive, 
and shall argue that on closer examination these very data even suggest that 
there is a causal connection between the past experience and the present 
memory, though this connection does not consist of a transmission of content3. 
In the constructive part (section 3), and building on the critical discussion of 
STM, I shall advocate a qualified sensorimotor approach to episodic 
remembering, on which particular procedural patterns are transmitted over time 
in such a way as to provide resources on which the success of remembering 
depends. Appealing to recent empirical data on patterns of eye movements 
involved in the imagery of episodic memory, I will consider the possibility that 
this dependence forms at least a part of the causal connection CTM has been 
searching for. 
2 – PROBLEMS WITH STM’S ANTI-CAUSALIST ARGUMENTS 
In this section, I introduce the causal theory of memory in its standard 
version and the criticisms raised against it by STM, diagnosing that the main 
STM’s anti-causalist move is to reject the necessity of a transmission of 
content over time. Then I proceed to show that the empirical data to which 
STM appeals are both incomplete and inconclusive. Instead, I will say, they 
bring support to the notion that our episodic memories involve a causal 
connection to the past, even though this connection does not consist of a 
transmission of content. 
2.1 - The debate around CTM 
Definition of standard CTM.   
On Martin & Deutscher’s (1966) seminal paper, for a mental state to qualify as 
an episodic memory, it must be linked to the past experience of the event it 
represents by a causal connection. Specifically: 
                                                 
3 I will thereby echo and endorse Robins’ (2020a) recent contention that those who insist there is an 
important difference between remembering and imagining –a claim that favours so-called 
“discontinuism” (Perrin, 2016) – have good empirical reasons to oppose simulationism and its 
“continuist” stand. Though for different reasons, I will like her advocate “a naturalistically oriented, 
empirically-informed discontinuism between memory and imagination” (2020, p. 1). 
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• (CTM) A subject S has an episodic memory M of a particular past 
event e if and only if 
o S had an experience E of e in the past. 
o S has now a representation M of e. 
o M has an appropriate causal connection to E. 
A straightforward question raised by this definition is what the allegedly 
necessary causal connection is. In other words, what are the conditions this 
connection has to satisfy to be an appropriate connection and to be part of the 
definition of episodic memories? Intuitively, being appropriate for a causal 
connection involves three conditions. (1) Firstly, there must be a causal 
continuity between E and M. By this condition, Martin and Deutscher intend to 
exclude cases like the following one. Imagine S underwent E in the past, but 
suffered a blow of such a strength that any trace of E is removed from his 
brain. Later on, during a session of hypnosis, the hypnotist tells S of an event 
that is, by luck, strictly similar to e. Thus, when the hypnotist awakens S, S has 
a representation of e. Since no causal connection relates the representation of e 
introduced by the hypnotist to E, Martin and Deutscher claim that it does not 
qualify as an episodic memory. (2) Secondly, E must be causally operative in 
the production of M. Martin and Deutscher thereby intend to exclude cases like 
the following: Imagine S underwent E in the past, tells his friend S’ of M, then 
suffered a blow such that any trace of E is removed from his brain. Later on, S’ 
relates back to S the memory that he (S) had told him before suffering the 
blow. Thus, by relearning M, S has now a representation of an event e he 
experienced in the past and whose experience is the causal source of his current 
representation of e. Since no direct causal connection relates the representation 
of e as reintroduced to S by S’ to E itself, Martin and Deutscher claim that it 
does not qualify as an episodic memory. (3) Lastly, the causal link between M 
and E must take the form of a trace structurally analogue to E. Martin and 
Deutscher thereby intend to exclude cases like the following: Imagine S had E 
in the past, that there is a direct causal connection between M and E, but that 
what E has left in S is a state of suggestibility such that as someone prompts S 
about e, S produces a representation identical to his past experience of e. Since 
it is not E that is stored in S – more precisely: not a structural analogue of E – 
Martin and Deutscher claim that the representation of e in S due to his 
suggestibility does not qualify as an episodic memory. 
Overall, actual causal connection, direct causal connection, and structural 
analogue traces are the three conditions for a causal connection between E and 
M to be considered as appropriate, bearing in mind that an appropriate causal 
connection is a necessary condition for a mental state to qualify as an episodic 
memory. 
Virtues of CTM. CTM has some prima facie virtues, to be sure. Werning 
(2020) points out three, namely: intuitive, explanatory, and taxonomical 
virtues. Firstly, CTM aligns nicely with how folk psychology conceptualizes 
remembering. Take for instance the relearning scenario mentioned above. In 
this scenario, because of the absence of a direct causal link, many people are 
likely to refuse to say that S remembers and to declare that S merely imagines 
having experienced the accident. If our philosophical concepts must give room 
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to our intuitions, then CTM has a good point. Secondly, CTM also has 
explanatory virtues. Take for instance the fact that our episodic memories have 
the role of a privileged epistemic source. For instance, a belief about an event e 
grounded on an episodic memory of e is generally assigned a much stronger 
epistemic value than a belief derived from a mere testimony about e (Mahr & 
Csibra, 2018). Appealing to an appropriate causal link smoothly explains the 
privileged epistemic value of the former relative to the latter, since as far as 
episodic memories are concerned the information that forms the content of the 
belief comes directly from the experience of the event the belief is about. On 
the face of it, CTM can also smoothly explain the ability of an episodic 
memory to refer to, or to be about, a particular event experienced in the past. 
Indeed, it can state that this particular reference relation is grounded on the 
particular causal connection that links the memory to the experience of the past 
event. Lastly, CTM also has taxonomical virtues, since it provides a criterion to 
distinguish between memory and imagination. Take the scenario of a veridical 
confabulation, in which one has an accurate imagistic representation of a past 
event that one has experienced while one’s representation of the event is not 
actually due to that experience, as in Martin & Deutscher’s hypnotist scenario. 
We will likely be reluctant to count the representation of the event as an 
episodic memory and will prefer to consider it as a case of imagination. The 
absence of a causal connection in such a scenario provides an appealing way to 
ground this taxonomical stand4. 
Standard CTM’s transmissionist and preservationist commitments. However 
appealing it might be, standard CTM has been criticized on a number of 
grounds, some saying that the causal condition should be revised – we can call 
this view “neo-causalism” (Debus, 2010; Michaelian, 2011; Perrin, 2018; 
Werning, 2020)  – while others say that the causal condition should be squarely 
dropped from the definition of episodic memory – a view we can call “post-
causalism” (De Brigard, 2014; Michaelian, 2016; Fernández, 2019; see 
Michaelian and Robins, 2018 for a review). In this paper, I explore the 
prospect of a proceduralist neo-causalist account of episodic memory. Before 
introducing this view, I shall pave the way for it by discussing STM. In order 
to see exactly what going beyond standard CTM means for STM, it will be 
useful to start by making explicit two of CTM’s commitments5. 
Firstly, CTM endorses transmissionism (TRANS). Let’s call “endogenous” 
the content at retrieval that originates in the experience of the remembered 
event. By contrast, let’s call “exogenous” the content at retrieval coming from 
sources distinct from the experience of the remembered event. Overall, the 
“exogenous-endogenous” pair thus captures two different relationships 
regarding content between encoding and retrieval. As we saw, according to 
CTM, endogenous content – in particular, as far as episodic memory is 
concerned, endogenous experiential content – is stored under the form of a 
structurally analogue memory trace through which it is transmitted from 
encoding to retrieval by an appropriate causal connection. Secondly, CTM 
                                                 
4 That causalism can give us a satisfying distinction between genuine remembering and veridical 
confabulation is in fact a disputed issue. On this, see the ongoing debate about confabulation between 
simulationists and causalists (Robins, 2020b; Michaelian, 2021). 
5 See Michaelian and Robins, 2018, pp. 22-23 for the preservationism-transmissionism distinction. 
234 Denis PERRIN 
-  D o s s i e r  -  
endorses preservationism (PRES). According to CTM, the information 
conveyed by the content of the experience of the past event remains (more or 
less) the same – that is, it is preserved from encoding to retrieval. Note that 
TRANS does not imply PRES. For instance, it can happen that all the content 
of one’s memory is endogenous while the different components of the content 
are ordered in a way that is completely different from the way they were in the 
past, thus conveying very different information from that acquired at encoding. 
In other words, TRANS is compatible with cases of content transformation. It 
can also happen that additional content is built into the initial content in such a 
way that the resulting information is very different from that initially acquired. 
In other words, TRANS is compatible, at least in part, with cases of content 
generation. Also note that conversely PRES does not imply TRANS. For 
instance, it can happen that using content coming from sources different from 
the experience of the remembered event conveys accurate information about 
the past experience. In other words, PRES is compatible with cases of content 
duplication. Now, while CTM endorses TRANS and PRES due to its notion of 
a structurally analoguous memory trace, STM rejects them both due to its 
adhesion to (respectively) reliabilism and constructivism6, with reliabilism 
meaning that being a representation of a past experienced event produced by a 
well-functioning (or: reliable) cognitive system suffices for a mental state to 
qualify as a genuine episodic memory, and constructivism meaning that at 
encoding and over the whole temporal course of memory, operations occur that 
result in a deep transformation of the content of our memories. But what really 
matters for STM’s move away from CTM is its rejection of TRANS. Indeed, 
on CTM, being necessary for a causal connection means that the very same 
content must be transmitted from encoding to retrieval. By arguing that for an 
episodic memory to occur there can be – and is often is – no transmission of 
content at all, STM is able to claim that it is not necessary that a causal 
connection be built into the definition of an episodic memory. 
Given that STM’s main move away from CTM consists in rejecting 
TRANS, in what follows I will consider the specific way STM targets TRANS. 
Michaelian’s own elaborate version of STM (2016, 2021) draws on two 
distinct arguments: an anti-sufficiency argument and an anti-necessity 
argument. Both start from empirical premises, but in each case the premise is 
different: the former is grounded on the (empirically documented) constructive 
character of memory, the latter is grounded on the (empirically documented) 
similarities of remembering and imagining. Given the goal of my paper, I 
restrict myself to discussing the anti-necessity argument7. 
                                                 
6 Constructivism about memory has a relatively long history in psychology (see Bartlett, 1932 for a 
seminal articulation of this view). Following a standard usage, I will speak of the “constructive” 
character of memory to designate the processes occurring at encoding as well as during consolidation 
and reconsolidation that carve up the retrieved content, and of the “reconstructive” character of 
remembering to designate the operations that one carries out as one is remembering and producing a 
particular representation of an experienced past event. 
7 The anti-sufficiency argument is as follows: (Empirical premise) A large body of both neuroimaging 
and behavioural evidence has documented the many constructive processes that episodic memories 
undergo over time, from the initial stages of encoding and consolidation through to the stages of 
remembering and reconsolidation (see Michaelian (2011; 2016) for a detailed exposition of these 
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2.2 - STM’s anti-necessity argument 
STM claims to be an empirically-grounded theory of episodic memory 
(Michaelian, 2016), and it has been considered as such by most researchers 
(see for instance Craver, 2020). Now I will contend that STM is problematic 
precisely because of the empirical evidence on which it claims to be grounded. 
In a nutshell: its anti-necessity argument against TRANS relies on non-
conclusive empirical evidence. In this section, I shall expose the anti-necessity 
argument. In the next section, I explain why on closer examination it appears 
problematic. Here is Michaelian’s simulationist argument8: 
(1) Empirical premises 
a. (remembering-imagining similarity) A large body of both 
neuroimaging and behavioural evidence has shown strong similarities 
between episodic remembering and imagistic imagining activities, 
such as imagining one’s personal future, imagining a counterfactual 
past, or imagining oneself in a hypothetical situation. These 
similarities suggest that episodic remembering shares its neural and 
cognitive underpinnings with such activities. According to the 
hypothesis of the constructive episodic simulation (Schacter & Addis, 
2007), both episodic remembering and these other activities are 
underpinned by one unique neurocognitive episodic construction 
system. 
b (anti-transmissionism about imagining) The same body of empirical 
evidence also suggests that imagistic imagining, in its various guises, 
consists in combining experiential elements coming from various past 
experiences in a single imagistic scene. 
(2) Conclusions 
a. (from 1a and 1b) Remembering consists in combining experiential 
elements coming from past experiences in a single remembered scene 
(weak anti-TRANS). In Schacter and Addis’ terms: “memory is not a 
literal reproduction of the past, but rather is a constructive process in 
which bits and pieces of information from various sources are pulled 
together” (p. 773). 
                                                                                                                 
processes). (Conclusion) Therefore, the constructive character of memory is a direct argument against 
PRES, since it implies that a significant amount of information that differs from the information 
originally encoded is frequently built into the content of episodic memories. Thus, the appropriate 
causal connection is not sufficient to account for the whole amount of the remembered content. Now the 
rejection of PRES due to the constructive character of episodic memories implies the rejection of 
TRANS as well, since per definition additional generated content cannot be transmitted from the 
original experience. Therefore, the constructive character of memory implies that TRANS is not 
sufficient either. 
8 Michaelian appeals to this argument when he says: “Advocates of the simulation theory […] have 
motivated their preferred theory by appealing to empirical evidence for important similarities between 
remembering the past and imagining the future. […] The simulation theory of memory […] is motivated 
primarily by empirical evidence of important similarities between remembering the past and imagining 
the future, evidence that simulationists take to suggest that memory is a kind of imagination” 
(Michaelian, 2021, pp. 1-2). 
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b. (from 1a and 1b) Since per definition imagining does not require any 
transmission of content, and since remembering is similar to imagining 
and does involve exogenous content, it seems reasonable to conceive 
of remembering without positing any transmission of content through 
a causal connection (strong anti-TRANS). This conceptual possibility 
is what motivates Michaelian’s slippery slope argument (see 2016, 
pp. 103-104; 2021, p. 7). If one endorses a definition of episodic 
remembering along these lines, then a causal connection is not 
necessary any more. 
It is worth insisting that part of the motivation for (2b) in Michaelian’s 
simulationist anti-necessity argument is conceptual. As the distinction between 
(2a) and (2b) is intended to capture, what the empirical evidence on which 
STM draws affords, strictly speaking, is the weakly anti-TRANS conclusion 
that some of the content of an episodic memory can be exogenous. The step 
that leads from weak to strong anti-TRANS, namely the slipping move, is 
conceptual. Again, the slipping move goes from two empirical pieces of 
evidence – the inclusion of some exogenous content into remembering and the 
remembering-imagining similarity – to the conclusion that remembering does 
not need any transmitted content at all, while one would expect the conclusion 
that it does not need exclusively endogenous content. The only reason I can see 
for the step leading to the non-necessity conclusion is that the 
conceptualization of remembering as a species of imagining dispenses with 
positing any transmission of endogenous content. But again, this conceptual 
possibility is not implied by empirical data. I will even say below that the 
empirical data on which STM draws suggest an opposite move. If I am right, 
therefore, the anti-necessity claim is conceptually motivated but empirically ill-
grounded. In section 3, I will argue for an empirically motivated determination 
of what is and what is not necessary for a mental state to qualify as an episodic 
memory, namely a well-documented procedural causal dependence of episodes 
of remembering on the past experiences they represent. 
By way of illustration of my understanding of STM’s analysis, take the 
following quote by Michaelian where he explicitly endorses the slipping move: 
“While simulation of a given past episode presumably often draws on 
information originating in the agent’s experience of that particular episode, it 
will rarely draw exclusively on such information, and in principle it need not 
draw on such information at all” (2016, p. 103). On my reading, the last part of 
the quote – “in principle it need not draw on such information at all” – is not 
strictly motivated by the empirical evidence invoked by STM – again, the latter 
grounds merely weak anti-TRANS – but by the possibility of reconceptualizing 
remembering as a species of imagining, the detailed argument supporting this 
possibility being the reliabilist account of remembering. The upshot of this 
criticism of TRANS is, indeed, a definition of episodic remembering that 
dispenses with any causal connection thanks to the substitution of a reliabilist 
condition for the causal connection of CTM (Michaelian, 2016, p. 107). 
Overall, this simulationist argument leads to the following definition of an 
episodic memory: 
Embodied Episodic Memory: a New Case for Causalism?  237 
-  D o s s i e r  -  
• (STM) S has an episodic memory M of a particular past event e if and 
only if 
o S has a current representation R of e 
o R is produced by a properly functioning episodic system 
which aims to produce a representation of an episode 
belonging to S’s personal past. 
I now turn to the discussion of STM’s criticism of CTM. Given that I intend 
to explore the claim that an appropriate causal connection is constitutive of 
episodic remembering, I will focus on the anti-necessity argument. 
2.3 - Discussing STM’s anti-necessity argument 
Objection from the hidden premise. My first objection is that the anti-
necessity argument draws on a hidden premise that is problematic. For this 
argument to hold good, it must be true – this is the hidden premise – that there 
is just one kind of information that can be transmitted from encoding to 
retrieval through an appropriate causal connection, namely content. On this 
argument, indeed, the imagining-remembering similarity suggests that 
remembering – just like imagining – is perfectly conceivable without involving 
any endogenous content. But STM does not consider the possibility that 
another type of information – procedural, for instance, as I will argue – turns 
out to be necessary to carry out the reconstruction involved by remembering. 
This is problematic since the non-necessity of endogenous content does not 
entail by itself the non-necessity of any kind of information. Therefore, STM’s 
argument is pending9. 
Objection from the interpretation of empirical evidence (1). My second 
objection is that the very empirical literature relative to the remembering-
imagining similarities on which STM draws does not only provide reasons 
against CTM, but also reasons for CTM, namely for the unaddressed option 
mentioned by my first objection. Here are some quotes from Schacter and 
Addis (2007, emphasis added) that feed this objection: “several regions […] 
were significantly more active for future relative to past events, including 
bilateral premotor cortex and left precuneus.” (p. 781) “The right hippocampus 
was differentially engaged by the future event task, which may reflect the 
novelty of future events and/or additional relational processing required when 
one must recombine disparate details into a coherent event.” (p. 782) “Notably, 
in all regions exhibiting significant past-future differences, future events were 
associated with more activity than past events […]. We propose that this 
apparent regularity across neural regions and across studies reflects the more 
intensive constructive processes required by imagining future events relative to 
retrieving past events.” (p. 782) 
As I read them, these excerpts acknowledge an important difference 
between remembering and imagining, namely the lower cognitive cost engaged 
                                                 
9 I expand in section 3 on the suggestion of a transmission of non-representational information. 
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by the former relative to the latter10. Reconstructing an event experienced in the 
past turn out to be cognitively easier than constructing a novel imagined one. 
Now, such an empirical fact lends strong support to the idea that as far as 
remembering is concerned, something transmitted from the past experience is 
operative in remembering and decreases the required cognitive cost, while as 
far as imagining is concerned, no such transmission occurs, hence the cognitive 
cost is higher. In line with this reading, I draw two conclusions from the above 
excerpts. First, the very same empirical literature to which STM appeals with a 
view to arguing against the necessity of TRANS provides empirical support for 
the latter claim, since it suggests that there is a causal dependence of the 
reconstruction of the representation of an event on the past experience of that 
event. In consequence, contrary to what Michaelian says (2021, p. 8), there is a 
“non-arbitrary reason” to resist the slippery slope argument – namely an 
empirical reason. Second, empirical support is given to the possibility of the 
transmission of a type of information different from content and, more 
precisely, to the claim that procedural information is transmitted, since easier 
processing is observed in remembering relative to imagining. I shall elaborate 
on this notion of procedural information in section 3. 
Objection from the empirical evidence (2). My third objection is that the way 
STM tackles the issue of the relationship between remembering and perceiving 
is not satisfactory. STM appeals mainly to considerations about the 
remembering-imagining relationship to draw conclusions about the 
remembering-perceiving relationship. Bear in mind that STM’s argument goes 
like this: since remembering and imagining are very similar from the 
neurocognitive point of view, it seems very plausible that – just like with 
imagining – when one remembers an event one does not retrieve a content 
encoded when one was perceiving the event; as a consequence, it seems very 
implausible that there is a content-transmission relation from past perception to 
remembering. Note that the relationship between remembering and perceiving 
is only indirectly considered by this argument. Now, as I have shown with my 
first two objections, the debate between CTM and STM cannot be settled on 
the sole basis of empirical evidence regarding the relationship between 
remembering and imagining, since on second thought neurocognitive evidence 
also lends support to the causalist view. Therefore, on the one hand STM 
cannot argue as it does, and on the other hand, it would at this stage be a good 
argumentative policy to tackle the issue of the remembering-perceiving 
relationship by considering direct empirical investigations of this relationship. 
This is just what is done by many studies endorsing the sensorimotor model of 
memory that I will introduce in section 3. 
Let me take stock. My previous criticisms of STM pave the way for a 
defence of a non- standard version of CTM, and thus for a different view of the 
                                                 
10 As a reviewer observed, one could find these results insufficient to contest STM since they merely 
exhibit a frequent feature – namely the relatively-low-cognitive-cost feature – not a necessary feature, 
as should be expected from a proper definition of episodic memory. But STM’s definition of episodic 
memory faces the same problem, since it probably happens that endogenous content is transmitted just 
as described by CTM. Furthermore, assuming one wants an empirically-grounded characterization of a 
mental state, one certainly has to search for characteristic features that are highly frequent instead of 
necessary features, as Andonovski rightly insists (2020, p. 25). 
Embodied Episodic Memory: a New Case for Causalism?  239 
-  D o s s i e r  -  
causal connection allegedly involved in episodic memories. Indeed, they all 
converge towards the notion of procedural information transmitted from the 
past experience of an event to the remembering of that event. The hypothesis 
explored by the next section is precisely that an embodied sensorimotor 
approach to this procedural information can both provide this notion with 
empirical support and refine it conceptually. 
3 – A SENSORIMOTOR EMBODIED VERSION OF CAUSALISM 
In this section, I will consider an embodied approach to episodic memory as 
a better empirically grounded alternative to STM. Although almost inexistent 
in philosophy11 – hence the exploratory and programmatic character of the 
present paper – the embodied approach to episodic memory has gained 
important traction in cognitive neuropsychology over the past decades (see 
Ianì, 2019 for a review). However, this literature assigns various meanings to 
the notion of ‘being embodied’12. In the present paper, I will consider 
specifically a proceduralism-inspired sensorimotor approach because of both 
the rich empirical data it has accumulated in recent years and of its promising 
implications for the CTM vs STM debate. I shall first sketch out the core 
elements that define this version and then I shall give my arguments for it. 
3.1 - Designing a sensorimotor approach to episodic memory 
Proceduralism and the sensorimotor approach to episodic memory. Here is a 
significant quote that expresses the core proceduralist idea: “A particular 
feature of the propositionalist view that we dispute is the claim that all 
knowledge can be represented in the language-like symbols appropriate to a 
computer program (as in Newell, 1980). Indeed, Anderson (1983) among 
others seeks to reduce all procedural knowledge to the propositional. […] Our 
proposal is to do the opposite, that is, to accommodate declarative knowledge 
in operationalizable terms of actions – the procedures that characterize a 
person's acquisition and use of knowledge” (Kolers & Roediger, 1984, 
p. 429)13. I suspect that the general proceduralist claim that follows from this 
quote can be put like this: 
•  (Proceduralist claim) The acquisition and use of any piece of 
representational information requires skillful operations, and a form of 
knowing-how is required for these operations to be carried out; the set 
of these skillful operations forms a procedural piece of information 
and the corresponding knowledge is procedural knowledge. 
                                                 
11 For rare exceptions, see Sutton and Williamson, 2014; Rowlands, 2017; Peeters and Segundo-Otin, 
2019. 
12 For a review of the different senses available, see Clark, 1999; Sutton and Williamson, 2014; Dijkstra 
and Zwaan, 2014; Peeters and Segundo-Ortin, 2019. 
13 Kolers and Roediger also say: “our aim is to carry forward the attempt to account for all of a person's 
capabilities within the framework of skills or procedures. (…) On our account (…) cognitive processes 
may be well accommodated in procedural terms.” (id., p. 430). Others have expressed a similar view: 
“All knowledge is procedural” (Whittlesea, 1997, p. 215), or: “the concepts of declarative and 
procedural memory appear to have thinner boundaries” (Ianì, 2019, p. 12). 
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The proceduralist claim thus proposes to “proceduralise” representational 
content, viz. instead of considering only representational content, it insists that 
the theory of memory must also consider the procedures through which this 
content is reconstructed as a type of information that is encoded in the past and 
underwrites retrieval. 
In keeping with this general proceduralist claim, an important empirical 
literature has developed specifically about experiential imagistic content in 
episodic memories, the upshot of which is the “sensorimotor model of 
memory” (SMM)14: 
• (SMM) The acquisition and use of any piece of remembered 
experiential representational information requires skillful operations, 
and a form of knowing-how is required for these operations to be 
carried out; the set of these operations are procedural pieces of 
information, and the corresponding knowledge is procedural 
knowledge. 
Let’s refine SMM. As it stands, SMM suffers from an ambiguity. 
Evidently, it can support one of two views, depending on how precisely one 
conceives of the procedural information that is supposedly encoded and drawn 
upon at retrieval. 
On one hand, it can be taken as the view that the imagistic content of an 
episodic memory is made up of sensorimotor components (Barsalou, 1999; 
Rubin, 2006)  – call it SMM1. For instance, S can have the episodic memory M 
of pulling over to the sidewalk because a runaway car threatened to hit him. In 
this case, S’s motor action is a component of what M represents, in just the 
same way as are S’s sensory experiences of seeing the car running towards 
him. On this version, the sensory and the motor characters are features of the 
imagistic content of the reconstructed memory. 
On the other hand, SMM can be taken as the view that the imagistic content 
of an episodic memory is reconstructed through motor procedures (Nilsson et 
al., 2000; Ianì, 2019)15 – call it SMM2. For instance, as S episodically 
remembers seeing the car running towards him, S’s motor action – e.g., S’s 
oculomotor actions and posture actions on the basis of which he perceives the 
past event – are not in themselves a component of what M represents, but are 
rather the procedures by which he carries out the reconstruction of the content 
of M. In other words, while sensory as well as motor information can be 
included in the content, this second version of SMM maintains that in an 
episode of remembering there is also a certain motor information – let’s call it 
a “procedural pattern” – that is not included into the imagistic content but on 
which S draws to reconstruct that content. 
                                                 
14 As I want to explore an embodied approach to episodic memory, I will focus on sensorimotor 
procedures in what follows. However, it is evident that these procedures do not exhaust the full range of 
procedures involved in episodic remembering – for instance, neural patterns provide another set of 
available procedures. 
15 This is clearly one of the main claims made by Kolers when he says that he wants: “to accommodate 
declarative knowledge in operationalizable terms of actions – the procedures that characterize a person's 
acquisition and use of knowledge” (1984, p. 429). Roediger et colleagues speak of “an action-oriented 
approach to cognitive processing” (2002, p. 321). 
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SMM and the CTM-STM controversy. Let’s go back to the CTM vs STM 
controversy. What notion of causal connection is brought into play in each 
version of SMM? And how does each fare with respect to STM’s criticisms 
against CTM? 
If SMM1 were to be phrased in causalist terms, it would hardly avoid the 
criticisms that STM raises against CTM. What STM is about, indeed, is the 
imagistic content of episodic memories. Now, if STM is right to say that the 
components of the imagistic content of a memory often come from sources 
different from the past experienced event represented by the memory, then 
given that motor components are imagistic components too, there is no reason 
to deny that, just like sensory components, they can come from various 
sources. In line with this remark, I will not argue against STM when it rejects 
TRANS with regard to imagistic content. However, if SMM2 were to be 
phrased in causalist terms, it would have more chance of avoiding the 
criticisms raised by STM against CTM. What SMM2 is about, indeed, is not 
the sensorimotor imagistic content of episodic memories but the motor 
information on the basis of which the content is reconstructed. Thus, STM’s 
criticisms of CTM do not apply straightforwardly to this information. It is 
therefore worth investigating whether SMM2 can meet these criticisms16. To 
conclude this section, let’s turn the more promising SMM2 into a definition of 
episodic remembering. The resulting definition reads as follows: 
• (SMM2) S has an episodic memory M of a particular past event e iff 
o S had an experience E of e in the past on the basis of a 
procedural pattern p. 
o S has now a representation M of e. 
o M has an appropriate causal connection to E that consists in 
re-enacting it at retrieval on the basis of p. 
In what follows, I will assess how far one can argue for SMM2, suggesting 
that a procedural pattern that is in play while encoding a particular past 
experience could be the one that comes into play while remembering that 
experience. I will make my assessment by appealing to three series of 
                                                 
16 Interestingly, a reviewer raises the issue “about whether the sensorimotor approach, even in its second 
formulation (i.e. SMM2), can successfully deal with the challenge raised by the simulation theory”, 
arguing that for it to do so, one would need to show that memory systems are dedicated to storing 
individual memory procedural traces for every experience we have. For reason of space, I cannot do full 
justice to this objection. Minimally, first I insist on the fact that in Schacter and Addis’ constructive 
episodic simulation hypothesis information is stored and reused to construct simulations. Second, as I 
have detailed above (see section 2.3), the empirical data these authors provide strongly suggest that 
procedural information is stored. Third, grounding remembering on a neurocognitive system that also 
underpins cognitive operations like episodic future thought or counterfactual thought of the past leaves 
open the possibility that this unique system does not underpin all the aforementioned operations in 
exactly the same way.  In other words, the unicity of the system does not exclude the specificity of its 
various achievements, with remembering possibly relying on the reactivation of procedural patterns. 
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empirical data that support this view, and will unfold the philosophical 
implications of each. 
3.2 - Arguing for SMM2 
Three series of empirical data. Let’s argue first for the empirical adequacy of 
SMM2. To do so, I present three series of empirical data that lend support to 
this view. 
Firstly, we saw that on closer examination, the data that STM appeals to for 
empirical support exhibit a procedural causal dependence of episodic memories 
on the past experienced events they represent, namely a benefit in terms of 
cognitive engagement in remembering relative to imagining. My suggestion is 
that the benefit which accrues here is due in part at least to the reactivation of 
procedural patterns during remembering17. The fact that these patterns are 
encoded and transmitted over time can contribute to explaining why it is easier 
to reconstruct the experience of a past event compared to constructing an 
imaginary event, for which no particular pattern is available18. If this is correct, 
then SMM2 is well-equipped to account for the remembering-imagining 
dissimilarity under consideration, and it turns out to be supported by the very 
empirical data that were supposed to weaken causalism. 
Secondly, SMM2 also finds significant empirical support in the notion that 
perceptual experience crucially involves motor activity from the perceiving 
subject, as is claimed by the sensorimotor approach to visual perception 
(O’Regan and Noë, 2001; Noë, 2004). On this view, perceptual experience 
does not result from a passive impingement of the surrounding world on the 
sensory system. Rather, it results from an active motor exploration carried out 
by the body. Perception is “enacted” through the sensorimotor coupling 
between the body and its environment. More specifically, any perceptual state 
is underpinned by bodily postures and actions to the effect that being in such a 
state requires knowing to which bodily posture or action it is correlated. By 
this knowledge, a merely sensory state acquires its representational content. 
For instance, for S to apprehend a visual sensation as the perception of a 
certain aspect of an object, S must not only apprehend the visual sensation 
procured by the object, but he must also know that the sensation is correlated 
with a certain position with respect to the object; together with certain other 
possible sensorimotor correlations, like the visual sensations he would enjoy if 
he moved from his current position to another one by moving around the 
object. According to O’Regan and Noë, the knowledge of these correlations –
which they call “knowledge of sensorimotor contingencies” (O’Regan & Noë, 
2001)  – is “implicit” and “practical” rather than a piece of representational 
information, and is constantly reiterated during the episode of perceiving. My 
suggestion is that SMM2’s notion of “sensorimotor” is closely similar to 
                                                 
17 Again, obviously other non-motor procedures also are executed and involved in remembering. 
18 A general worry raised by a reviewer concerns the very possibility for procedural information as 
understood in this paper to be encoded and retrieved. I endorse a positive view on this point by invoking 
the empirical data that exhibit that ways of doing – in particular, motor skills – are encoded and 
retrieved with no obvious non-procedural information underlying them. But it is a controversial view. 
For a recent discussion, see De Brigard, 2019. 
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O’Regan and Noë’s notion on two important counts. First, both concern the 
motor actions – procedural patterns – required for a sensory experience to be 
apprehended as representing an event19. Moreover, both consider that these 
actions form implicit practical knowledge available to the experiencing subject, 
with O’Regan and Noë pointing out the role of this knowledge in perception 
and SMM2 pointing out its role in remembering. In line with this, I propose to 
say that the sensorimotor approach to visual perception mainly concerns the 
role of procedural information at the encoding of episodic memories, while 
SMM2 is mainly concerned with its role at retrieval. This outlines an enactivist 
sensorimotor approach to remembering that I will flesh out in the following 
paragraphs. 
Last, a notably well-developed series of data provides direct and detailed 
support for the notion of a particular procedural causal dependence of 
remembering on past experience. It is part of a wider view on which motor 
patterns encoded during past experience are reactivated during retrieval 
(Nilsson et al., 2000; Nyberg et al., 2001) – the so-called “reactivation 
hypothesis” (see Slotnick, 2017) – and it shows that the gaze movements 
carried out as an event e is experienced and a perceptual experience E occurs 
are replayed as the memory M of e occurs and are functional to the 
reconstruction of the imagistic content intrinsic to M (Laeng & Teoderescu, 
2002; Mäntylä & Holm, 2006; Kent & Lamberts, 2008; Johansson et al., 2012; 
Olsen et al., 2014; Laeng et al., 2014; Johansson & Johansson, 2014; 
Bochynska & Laeng, 2015)20. Typically, two parameters are tested by these 
studies: the way in which the eyes fix on the different elements of the scene 
apparent in the experienced event, and the sequential order of these fixations, 
which forms the scan pathway followed by the gaze as it explores the scene. 
Let’s consider an example of such studies. 
Laeng et colleagues (2014) report three experiments in which the 
participants first visually inspected a stimulus and were later asked to retrieve 
it through mental imagery. The gaze was monitored both at encoding and at 
retrieval in different conditions. Here are some details and interesting results. 
In their second experiment, subjects were presented with pictures of animals 
and were later asked, while looking at an empty grey screen (“looking at 
nothing” condition) to recall the animal in an imagistic way. They found that 
eye movements at recall substantially overlapped those used to scan the objects 
in the initial phase of the study, with this overlap being relatively fine-grained 
since encoding and retrieval were similar with respect not only to the part of 
the visual space where the gaze dwelled, but also to the most defining and 
salient features of the particular objects that formed the scene – for instance, 
the gaze dwelt more on the head of a deer than on its legs. Moreover, and most 
importantly, such an overlap predicted accuracy in memory tasks in that those 
participants who reenacted eye movements during recall more closely 
resembling the original movements also showed higher scores in spatial 
memory tasks. “[…] we found a strong correlation between a participant’s 
                                                 
19 Sensory and motor are thus not two components of the perceptual content. Instead, the latter is what 
turns the former into perceptual content. 
20 Though less studied, other motor patterns – such as gesture patterns, body posture patterns – have 
been documented and are potential empirical arguments for SMM2. 
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enactment fidelity and accuracy of spatial memory”, note Laeng and colleagues 
(2014, p. 272)21. In their third experiment, several conditions were used in order 
to show that “controlling the gaze during imagery can disrupt memory 
performance” (p. 273). In particular, in one condition subjects’ gaze was fixed 
on a location point distant from the original fixations. Interestingly, memory 
performance significantly decreased when gaze during recall was forced to 
remain on this fixation point. Therefore, interfering with gaze during recall 
seems to decrease the quality of the memory. 
This pattern of results has been replicated by multiple experiments. For 
instance, in an episodic memory task concerning visual scenes, Johansson and 
Johansson (2014) also found that a central fixation constraint perturbed 
retrieval performance by increasing reaction times needed for recalling such 
events, and that memory retrieval was facilitated when eye movements were 
manipulated toward parts of a blank area that was congruent with the original 
location of the object to be recalled. These results were also robust with respect 
to memory accuracy. Based on these data, Johansson and Johansson claim that: 
“remembering involves the reinstatement of the processes that were active 
during encoding, and the chance of remembering is best when the processes 
engaged by a retrieval cue overlap with those engaged at encoding” (pp. 1-2). 
Ianì notes too: “These results seem to suggest that there is a high gaze pattern 
correlation between perception and recall” (2019, p. 5). In sum, there is a 
growing amount of empirical evidence for strong correlations between bodily 
postures and motor actions – in particular eye movements22 – at encoding and 
retrieval, and most importantly, that these postures and motor actions are 
strongly functional at retrieval, and in particular with respect to the accuracy of 
our memories. 
A necessary dependence of episodic memories on procedural patterns. As the 
above data illustrate, the accuracy of episodic recollections appears to be 
strongly causally dependent on the re-enactment of the procedural pattern used 
at encoding. The data comply with two standard requirements for a causal 
dependence to occur23. The previous empirical data allow us to say on the one 
hand that – all things being equal – if there is re-enactment of the original 
procedural pattern, then there is accurate memory. It also allows us to say, on 
the other hand, that if the procedural pattern is not re-enacted – as in the 
condition in which the gaze is constrained to fix a location point distant from 
the original fixations – then the accuracy is diminished. Procedural pattern re-
enactment is thus a causal condition for accuracy of memory and, as far as 
empirical studies can say, a necessary one since its absence implies 
                                                 
21 I elaborate below on the importance of this point. 
22 For studies demonstrating the influence of other motor parameters in remembering, see Wesp, Hesse, 
Keutmann, & Wheaton, 2001; Stevanoni & Salmon, 2005; Ianì, Cutica & Bucciarelli, 2016; Ianì & 
Bucciarelli, 2018. 
23 Here I draw on the broad and widely endorsed characterization of causality as a relation of 
dependence of the occurrence of an effect on the occurrence of its cause, which could be fleshed out in 
counterfactual terms (see Lewis, 1973) as well as in probabilistic terms (see Hitchcock, 2016). Since my 
analysis does not depend on the specific view one has about causality, I will not pursue this point here. 
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inaccuracy24. Since, arguably, accuracy is the distinctive condition for a 
memory to be successful, then procedural pattern re-enactment is a necessary 
causal condition for successful remembering. 
Three comments will refine this point. Firstly, note that the causal 
dependence under consideration cannot be explained in terms of a generic 
procedural pattern that would derive from a set of closely similar particular 
experiences. Indeed, some of the experimental designs mentioned were 
cautious about using a sufficiently fine-grained material to avoid the 
interference of generic patterns and to secure particularity. For instance, the re-
enactment was observed for the vision of an animal in a particular posture 
rather than for a standard posture of the animal (Laeng et al., 2014, p. 273). 
Overall, causal dependence on procedural patterns holds for the mnemonic 
representation of particular scenes, which suggests that what is transmitted is 
particular patterns. If this is on the right track, then the particular causal 
connection of procedural patterns is necessary for successful remembering. 
Secondly, the objection could be made that the analysis given above only 
concerns visual imagistic information, which is crucial for but not exhaustive 
of episodic memory. After all, episodic memories also have auditory or 
emotional components, and evidently it is far from obvious that a sensorimotor 
account could do justice to them. A fortiori, the objection could continue, the 
sensorimotor approach under consideration has nothing to say of non-imagistic 
components of episodic memories – for instance, semantic components – while 
it is arguable that episodic memories involves such components. My reply is 
that, despite motor re-enactment being about one particular aspect of episodic 
memories, it concerns a core component of any successful remembering. Thus, 
though SMM2 does not claim to account for all the components of an episodic 
memory, it still provides an argument for the necessity of a causal connection 
for a core component of episodic memory. Last, the causal dependence claim is 
a straightforward argument against STM’s account of successful episodic 
memories. In line with its definition of episodic memory25, STM maintains that 
an episodic memory is successful if (and only if) it is an accurate 
representation R of e produced by a properly functioning (or: reliable) episodic 
system. If I am right, the previous empirical data and the causal dependence 
they exhibit show that a further condition is necessary, namely the transmission 
of procedural patterns. Note that by saying this I am not arguing against the 
conceptual possibility of accounting for successful remembering by using the 
sole notions of accuracy and reliability. In line with my remarks in section 2, I 
am arguing against the empirical adequacy of STM’s account, and I insist on 
the fact that conceptual possibility is not sufficient to reject the claim that a 
causal connection is necessary. 
Qualifying the philosophical implications. In keeping with the exploratory 
and qualified stand of this paper, two caveats must be added regarding the data 
on which I have grounded the SMM2 claim of a necessary causal dependence. 
                                                 
24 It has been observed that accuracy is dependent on both the points of fixation (Laeng et al., 2014, p. 
265; Johansson and Johansson, 2014) and on the path of the gaze (Bochynska & Laeng, 2015) at 
encoding. Again, see Ianì (2019, p. 4) for a review. 
25 See section 2.2. 
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The first caveat is about the notion of a degree of similarity of the 
procedural pattern as it is re-enacted relative to the procedural pattern carried 
out at encoding. People advocating proceduralism in cognitive psychology are 
eager to point out that there is no exact similarity here. For instance, according 
to Laeng and colleagues, the pattern of eye movement “does not necessarily 
recapitulate all processing that occurred during encoding […] that forming a 
mental image does not re-enact all aspects of what the participants did at the 
time of encoding. […] According to an enactivist account, if imagery uses eye 
positions as a scaffolding structure for generating a detailed image, then the 
pattern of gaze during imagery can be based on a subset of the original 
movements (viz., relevant gaze pointers; cf. Ballard et al., 1997) and it should 
actually tend to resemble the structure of the imagined object more than being 
a faithful repetition, in its minute details, of what gaze actually did during the 
original perceptual episode or encoding” (2014, p. 276). Re-enactment of 
procedural patterns is thus not about strict identity, but about close similarity. 
However, many causalist accounts on the philosophical side already endorse 
the notion of a close similarity (Michaelian, 2011; Werning, 2020, p. 307 for a 
detailed analysis of this notion). Though a precise specification of what “close” 
means can be difficult to give, the qualification should thus not be problematic 
for SMM2. 
More importantly, the second caveat is about the very notion of episodic 
memory. An important pending issue at this stage is indeed whether SMM2 and 
STM are really talking about the same thing and not talking past each other26. 
Indeed, the direct empirical evidence that I have just mentioned documents 
patterns of results for periods of time ranging from some milliseconds (Laeng 
et al., 2014) to one week (Martarelli and Mast, 2013), passing through to 15 
minutes (Laeng et al., 2014) and 48 hours (Bochynska & Laeng, 2015). 
Pointing out the relative briefness of this lapse of time, STM could object that 
by “episodic memory” it means memories occurring a much longer lapse of 
time after the experience they represent – namely, months or years later – 
rather than the comparatively recent memories tested by the aforementioned 
experiments. In other words, while SMM2 captures causal relations for a form 
of memory definitely distinct from working memory, viz. episodic memories –
procedural patterns observed at retrieval are not the mere maintenance over a 
very short period of time of an occurrence of these patterns – it does not 
provide evidence for long periods of time either, whereas STM’s anti-necessity 
objection against TRANS is about such old episodic memories. If TRANS 
proves unnecessary for these memories, then STM can conclude that a causal 
connection is not necessary for episodic memories. 
I see two options on the table at this stage. Let’s call them the optimistic 
and the longitudinal options. On the optimistic option, what SMM2 documents 
about recent episodic memories should be in principle replicable for old 
episodic memories. STM could object that the constructive character of 
memory renders very implausible the transmission of particular procedural 
patterns over long period of times. But on the one hand, we do not have the 
data needed to ground any of the optimistic or the simulationist claims, though 
                                                 
26 Thanks to Kirk Michaelian for helpful discussions on this point. 
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recent studies have started to explore this topic (see El Haj et al., 2020). More 
empirical work is definitely needed here. On the other hand, empirical studies 
suggest that what determines the number of constructive processes to which a 
memory has been submitted is not the temporal distance between it and the 
experience it represents, but the amount of times it has been retrieved, with 
each retrieval being an occasion of modification and reshaping. Consequently, 
being old for a memory does not exclude entertaining a particular causal 
relation to the past, and if the notion of procedural patterns is promising, being 
old for a memory does not exclude entertaining a particular procedural causal 
relation to the past. Now, on the alternative longitudinal option, even if STM 
turned out to be right about highly constructed episodic memories, yet SMM2 
could still say that it captures a causal connection for a specific way for 
episodic memories to evolve in time. In other words, on the longitudinal 
suggestion, a satisfying theory of episodic memory should allow for a 
distinction between different time courses in the dynamic existence of an 
episodic memory, with causalism under the form of SMM2 being the correct 
theory regarding relatively lightly constructed episodic memories and STM the 
correct theory regarding relatively highly constructed episodic memories. 
Furthermore, drawing on the same longitudinal approach, SMM2 could even 
say that STM concerns cases of imagination – that is, cases of memories that 
are so strongly constructed and reshaped that they present us with imaginings 
of the past – but it could also say that, as noted above, there are also old 
memories, namely memories that are relatively lightly constructed, which 
accordingly still entertain a particular causal relation to the past. Overall, and 
though I cannot pursue these suggestions here, they pave the way for a 
potential defence of causalism against STM27. 
4 – CONCLUSION 
What are we left with? With a picture that is mixed, to be sure, but 
nonetheless interesting. On the one hand, my argument for a sensorimotor 
approach to episodic memory is intended to qualify the claim that episodic 
memories are embodied, and thereby to specify more tightly than is the case in 
the extant literature what a reasonable application of the embodied cognition 
framework to episodic memory might look like. As it turns out, this claim 
holds good for visual imagistic content, but this success is less clear for other 
imagistic components, and still less clear for the semantic component of our 
episodic memories. Moreover, the embodied claim is empirically well-
supported for relatively recent episodic memories, but we lack empirical data 
as far as old episodic memories are concerned. Despite these limitations, we 
                                                 
27 An objection that could come to the reader’s mind is that even if one accepts that particular 
transmission is secured, there is still the question of whether this is sufficient to account for the 
particularity of the reference to the event experienced in the past. After all, a mental image proceeding 
from a reconstruction based on a particular procedural pattern does not determine by itself whether it 
refers to an iterative past experienced event or to a particular one. My reply is that the sensorimotor 
approach I have developed in this paper argues for the necessity of TRANS, not for its sufficiency, in 
line with the task I have set to myself. Thus, the objection is off the point. Another possible reply is that 
in fact the reference of most of our episodic memories is not to particular (singular) but to iterative 
experienced events (see Andonovski, 2020), and thus that here there is nothing about their reference that 
could be objected against SMM2. 
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have a case for a necessary particular causal connection regarding a major 
component of episodic memory (visual imagistic content), and thus we have an 
argument for TRANS, which is the main target of STM as it argues against 
CTM. If this is right, then we should give serious consideration to a 
sensorimotor version of CTM. 
Assuming that the proposed sensorimotor approach is on the right track, 
then some prospects for future research can be suggested. I favour two by way 
of a final speculation. A first prospect is about the phenomenology of 
remembering, for which an embodied approach seems to be a hopeful option. 
Perrin and colleagues (2020) have recently argued for an embodied view about 
the feeling-of-pastness component of phenomenology, and empirical data 
suggest that the experience of reliving in episodic remembering is due to the 
imagistic sensorimotor content of the memory (Ianì, 2019, p. 15). An option 
that thus recommends itself is then to flesh out this dual phenomenology 
(Dokic & Martin, 2015) in terms of a two-tiered embodied approach on which 
one core phenomenological component is the result of the sensorimotor 
imagistic content of the memory, and the other is the result of the procedures –
in particular motor procedures – on the basis of which the imagistic content is 
reconstructed as one remembers. A second prospect is about the generation of 
content exhibited by a great many episodic memories, a feature that has been 
pointed out by STM as a potential difficulty for proceduralism (Michaelian & 
Robins, 2018) and that I have set aside in this paper since it is distinct from the 
necessity claim of CTM’s transmissionism. A final speculation is that not only 
does SMM2 have no problem with the idea of additional content since it argues 
for the necessity of TRANS and not for its sufficiency, but it can also nicely 
accommodate certain generative features of episodic memories. Take for 
instance the schematic character of the content of memories as illustrated by 
the superportrait phenomenon in which subjects recognize caricatures faster 
than they recognize faithful portraits (Rhodes, 1997; Koriat et al., 2000). 
Evidently, recognizing a face involves a certain visual scan pathway. The 
superportrait phenomenon could then be explained by the fact that though they 
are initially fine-grained, procedural patterns operative in retrieval tend to 
schematize over time and emphasize the main features of the pathway. I offer 
these two prospects for future research. 
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